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"DISCREDITED" AND "DISCREDITABLE": THE SEARCH FOR
POLITICAL IDENTITY BY PEOPLE WITH PSYCHIATRIC
DIAGNOSES
SUSAN STEFAN*

You're never the same-mental health diagnosis is an opinion and
attitude. You cannotcure or have remissionfrom others' attitudesof
rejection.1
Friendsand family-they don't understandmy illness/disabilitythey think I am getting away with something-thatthere is nothing
wrong with me.2

INTRODUCTION
Identity matters. In particular, identity matters to people who are
stigmatized and stereotyped because they belong to a socially
disfavored group. Although individual members of these groups may
have very different ideas about how to respond to prejudice and
mistreatment, the matter of identity itself-membership in the
group-is generally not at issue. Justice Clarence Thomas and the
Reverend Jesse Jackson may have sharply conflicting ideas about
the meaning of being an African American in our society, but the
identity of each man as an African American is hardly open to
question.
* Staff Attorney, Center for Public Representation, Newton, Massachusetts. I began
research for this Article as a professor of law at the University of Miami School of Law, where
I was greatly assisted as always by the wonderful reference librarians, my secretary, Joann
Manees, and by research assistant Marina Luybimova. I am also grateful for the insights of
Ira Burnim, Keith Elkin, David Oaks, and Vicki Smith.
1. SUSAN STEFAN, SURVEY FOR PEOPLE WHO HAVE BEEN GIVEN A PSYCHIATRIC LABEL,
unnumbered response (on file with author) [hereinafter STEFAN SURVEY); see infra notes 57-59
and accompanying text for an explanation of survey methodology.
2. STEFAN SURVEY No. 92.
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When it comes to disabilities, however, these distinctions begin
to blur, in part because disability is as much about environmental
context and social functioning as it is about any physical or mental
characteristic. Asthma may or may not be a disability, depending on
the presence of pollen and pollutants in the air. Mild mental
retardation may be less disabling in a rural farming community
than in a busy urban environment. In addition, impairments exist
along a spectrum, both physical and functional, rather than
representing a dichotomy between a class of clearly identified
disabled people differentiated unmistakably from nondisabled
people. Therefore, a person's self-identification as "disabled" is often
not as automatic as self-identification with respect to race and sex.
In fact, self-identification as a person with a disability is often a
long, complex, and difficult process. In this respect it may resemble
self-identification as gay or lesbian.
Disability, unlike race and sex, but like sexual preference, is
usually not identifiable at birth,3 and often becomes salient in an
individual's life after she has formed a personal identity. Indeed,
one of the most hurtful aspects of disability discrimination is that
newly disabled persons find it very difficult to accept that people
who knew them before they became disabled can treat them so
differently once they are disabled, and people with hidden
disabilities are shocked when they are abandoned by old friends and
even family after they reveal their disabilities.
The fact that disabilities exist along a spectrum contributes to
another disparity between the identity of disabled people and the
identity of people in other groups that experience discrimination.
Because disabilities exist along a spectrum, it is unclear when
someone actually becomes "disabled." Disability is a status that is
initially identified, named, or conferred, not by the individual, but
by "experts," usually medical experts, although the ramifications of
disability are significantly social and political.
3. A number of articles have pointed out that gender is not always self-evident, and is
sometimes assigned at birth, and that racial characteristics exist along a spectrum that
permits "passing" and its attendant social issues. See, e.g., Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Destabilizing
Racial ClassificationsBased on Insights Gleanedfrom Trademark Law, 84 CAL. L. REV. 887,
919 (1996); Chanika Phornphutkul et al., Gender Self-Reassignment in an XY Adolescent
Female Born with Ambiguous Genitalia, 106 PEDIATRICS 135, 135-37 (July 2000). I do not
dispute these contentions, but here make a general point about the majority of cases.
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Furthermore, unlike race or gender, experts hold themselves out
as being able to mitigate or treat disability." Although people with
disabilities have challenged the claims and dominance of experts for
many years, experts retain a position of primacy in defining both
the categories and the meaning of physical and mental disability,
and are considered the only authority on the mitigation, treatment
or cure of the disability.5
The centrality of experts to the experience of disability has
enormous social, legal, and political consequences. A large number
of cases under the Americans with Disabilities Act involve claims by
the plaintiff that she is disabled.6 Defendants dispute these claims
by hiring experts to refute the plaintiffs claims to identity as a
person with a disability. In many cases, the Supreme Court has
rejected the plaintiff's claim to belong to the protected group
-persons with disabilities.7 This process-permitting experts and
the judiciary to determine whether an individual fits into a
protected class-would be unthinkable in the case of race, gender,
age, religion, or sexual orientation.
Moreover, some disabilities are not readily apparent. People with
invisible disabilities confront issues about disclosure, whereas
people with visible disabilities have fewer secrets to keep and

4. In the past, this was also true of sexual preference. Claims by experts to identify,

categorize, and treat sexual preference, however, have lost credibility in the last twenty years,
particularly since the American Psychiatric Association removed homosexuality from the
Diagnosticand StatisticalManual of Mental Disordersin 1980. The pressure and advocacy

that accomplished this deletion was clearly recognized by the gay and lesbian community as
a political move, and the excision of homosexuality from the category of deviances identified
and treated by psychiatric experts was indeed a political victory, because it represented an
essential first step toward the normalization of this identity within society. Thus, freeing an
identity from expert taxonomy may be essential to political development.
5. DEBORAH A. STONE, THE DISABLED STATE (1984); Matthew Diller, Entitlement and
Exclusion: The Role of Disability in the Social Welfare System, 44 UCLA L. REV. 361,416-17

(1996).
6. The Americans with Disabilities Act also allows claims on the basis of history of

disability or being regarded as disabled, but the vast majority of cases involve people who
claim to be presently disabled. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§
12101-12213 (2000).

7. See, e.g., Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516 (1999) (holding that high
blood pressure did not limit the individual's life activities); Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527
U.S. 471 (1999) (holding that severe myopia did not qualify as a disability because of the

availability of corrective lenses).
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choices to make in this arena.8 Issues surrounding self-revelation
and "coming out" are crucial to many people with invisible
disabilities. These people may go to enormous lengths to conceal
their disabilities from their colleagues at work and even their
families. In this respect they are also similar to those in the gay and
lesbian community.
Within the contingent and malleable category of disability,
psychiatric disability raises perhaps the most perplexing questions
about identity. First, although almost every disability has some
effect on social functioning, psychiatric disability is, from the point
of view of the external observer, completely characterized by
difficulties, deficits, or aberrations in social functioning. In the
absence of unmistakable problems in social functioning, an
individual's self-report of psychiatric disability is likely to be
discredited, disbelieved, or minimized. An individual with a severe
physical disability who climbs Mount Everest or performs some
equivalent feat is lauded for courage and tenacity;9 but an
individual who reports severe psychiatric difficulties yet continues
to function is simply disbelieved.10 Or worse, the person is criticized
for self-pity, exaggeration, or self-dramatization."
Second, psychiatric difficulties not only exist along a spectrum of
impairment, as do most disabilities, but they are also temporally
contingent: the same person may vary over a period of weeks
between functioning extremely well and being immobilized and
dysfunctional.' Though some people with psychiatric disabilities
8. In some cases, people with visible disabilities do make choices about keeping their
disabilities secret. For example, John Hockenberry, former reporter for National Public Radio
(NPR), filed stories with NPR from an Oregon affiliate for years before he had to disclose that
he used a wheelchair when he missed a deadline because he could not find a telephone booth
he could fit into to file a report. JOHN HOCKENBERRY, MOVING VIOLATIONS: WAR ZONES,
WHEELCHAIRS, AND DECLARATIONS OF INDEPENDENCE 168-70 (1995).
9. Christy Hoppe, Ready to Take on Mount Everest; 'It's aboutthe capabilitiesofpeople
with disabilities,"DALLAS MomNING NEwS, Nov. 21, 2002, at 31A; James B. Meadow, Head

in the Clouds; Blind Climbers' Dreams Lead Him to Bag World's Highest Mountain Peaks,
ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEws, Dec. 26, 2002, at 6A.
10. WALTER OLSON, THE EXCUSE FACTORY: How EMPLOYMENT LAW is PARALYZING THE
AMERICAN WORKPLACE (1997).
11. See ALAN DERSHOWITZ, THE ABUSE EXCUSE AND OTHER COP-OUTS, SOB STORIES AND
EVASIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY (1994).
12. EEOC, EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON THE AMERICANS wTH DISABILITIES ACT
AND PSYCHIATRIC DISABILITIES, app. question 8, at http'/www.eeoc.gov/docs/psych.html (last
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cycle between states of functioning well and disability, it is also true
that many individuals experience severe psychiatric disability while
concurrently managing to "pass" as functional."i
Finally, although almost everyone who receives a diagnosis of
mental illness personally experiences profound emotional distress,
the identification and transformation of profound distress into
disability, by any of its various names--disability, mental illness,
insanity-is made by an "expert," who is by definition an individual
outside the group. Although some mental health professionals are
also people with severe psychiatric disabilities, very few are public
about their history and experiences.
The determination by experts that a person has a "mental
illness," sometimes after fifteen minutes of evaluation in a hospital
emergency room, unites into one category millions of people with
extraordinarily divergent personal experiences who might otherwise
never think to identify with each other. The classification itself is
often disputed and subject to widely conflicting opinions and
disagreement, both among the experts and among the persons
labeled mentally ill or mentally disabled.
For example, some people for whom the diagnosis of psychiatric
disability has been crucial to their identity deny that they have any
mental illness at all. According to Janet Gotkin:
"That is part of our condition, to feel despair. That is what I am
feeling and it is black and it wells up inside until you feel that
you will explode with the heaviness of this sense of yourself,
alone, in this unfeeling darkness that can be the world. Women
and men have looked down into the pit that is themselves and
that is life and questioned the meaning and mourned the futility
of it all.4No amounts of Thorazine will ever make this feeling go
away."1

visited Feb. 5, 2003) ("For some individuals, psychiatric impairments such as bipolar disorder,
major depression, and schizophrenia may remit and intensify, sometimes repeatedly, over the
course or several months of several years.").
13. See KATHY CRONKITE, ON THE EDGE OF DARNKESS: CONVERsATIONS ABOUT
CONQUERING DEPRESSION (1994) (interviewing Mike Wallace, Joan Rivers, Rod Steiger, and
others); ELIZABETH WURTZEL, PROZAC NATION: YOUNG AND DEPRESSED IN AMERICA (1995).
14. JANET GOTIN & PAUL GOTIUN, Too MUCH ANGER, Too MANY TEARS: A PERSONAL

TRIUMPH OVER PSYCHIATRY 377 (1975) (quoting Janet Gotkin).
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She continues:
This was not an illness. I was not being "sick" and having
symptoms. This was me-living....
"There is no such thing as schizophrenia, not outside some
psychiatrist's imagination. There is pain and people's odd
convoluted ways of trying to survive in the world. That's real.
Not mental illness." 15
This perspective is different from people with physical disabilities
who refuse to concede that their illness or impairments have
rendered them disabled. In the case of psychiatric disability-and
only psychiatric disability-a significant number of people with
psychiatric diagnoses deny that they have a medical impairment at
all, as opposed to denying that the impairment disables them. 6
However, it is important to note the general fallacy of the charge by
some psychiatrists that people with psychiatric disabilities deny
that they have any problems at all, and that this "lack of insight"
itself requires treatment. It is far more accurate to say that some
people with psychiatric diagnoses deny that they have a medical
impairment suitable for diagnosis and treatment by psychiatric
experts. Virtually all the written accounts by former psychiatric
patients who reject psychiatry acknowledge that they have
experienced fundamental personal emotional crises.' Sometimes
these crises are called spiritual, and sometimes existential,
according to the philosophy of the individual. People with this
perspective speak of recovery and healing rather than treatment,
and it is clear that for many of them, the social consequences of
those crises-involuntary commitment and forced treatment-are
political issues, and their political identity as a former psychiatric
patient plays as crucial a role in forming their personal and political
identity as race, gender, or sexual preference.
15. Id. at 383.
16. JUDI CHAMBERLIN, ON OUR OWN: PATIENT-CONTROLLED ALTERNATIVES TO THE MENTAL

HEALTH SYSTEM (1978); GOTIN & GOTEIN, supra note 14, at 383.
17. See, e.g., BEYOND BEDLAM: CONTEMPORARY WOMEN PSYCHIATRIC SURVIVORS SPEAK
OUT (Jeanine Grobe ed., 1995); CHAMBERLIN, supra note 16; CRY OF THE INVISIBLE: WRITINGS
FROi THE HOMELESS AND SURVIVORS OF PSYCHIATRIC HOSPITALS (Michael A. Susko ed., 1991);
SETH FARBER, MADNESS, HERESY, AND THE RUMOR OF ANGELS: THE REVOLT AGAINST THE
MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM (1993); GOTKIN & GOTKIN, supra note 14.
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Others who concede that their lives have been profoundly affected
by psychiatric disability appear to deny that it plays any part in
their continuing personal identity. William Styron, author of
Darkness Visible, says at the end of the book that "[slave for the
awfulness of certain memories it leaves, acute depression inflicts
few permanent wounds.""8
Still another group of people believes that psychiatric disability
is central to its identity, but considers it an illness with no political
meaning:
Before [these episodes of depression] happened, I would identify
myself [as] a white male. Now I identify myself as a mentally ill
white male. I don't know if it makes a difference, that's how I see
myself, how I describe myself. Maybe in a way it's kind of selfdefeating to look at myself that way. If the first thing that I use
to identify myself is an illness, that kind of perpetuates the

depression. It's not honest to ignore it, or to say that the power
of positive thinking will somehow make it go away. I
definitely-it's been the most defining thing in my life for the
last two years, and it's affected all areas of my life, so I don't
know how I couldn't lead off with that descriptor. I wouldn't call
myself a white male with depression, maybe in the future if it's
not so pervasive I can change. There really is a tremendous
amount of guilt about it, somehow that it's my fault, if I'm
discriminated against, that I deserve it, that's part of being
depressed. 9
These very different reactions to the experience of emotional
suffering, the experience of diagnosis and treatment, and the issue
of identity itself create a difficult situation for a group that decades
of social science research confirms is subject to enormous
discrimination. In order to assert that one is being discriminated
against because of membership in a certain group, one must both
accept membership in the group and externalize negative experiences. In other words, one must be able to recognize such
experience as discrimination, rather than deserved treatment. This

acceptance and externalization are crucial to seeing one's identity
18. WILLIAM STYRON, DARKNESS VIsiBLE: A MEMOIR OF MADNESS 75 (1990). It did,
however, have enough impact on him to lead him to write a book.
19. Interview with KE. (Mar. 15, 2002) (on file with author).
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in a political context. Externalization, however, requires that one
have sufficient self-esteem and internal resources to believe that
social difficulties are primarily the result of unfair and unjustified
treatment by others, and that the generalizations made by those in
power about the group to which one belongs are at best mistaken
and at worst purposeful oppression. A claim of discrimination is
obviously a political claim of unjustified treatment on the basis of
membership in a certain group. Both the recognition that the
treatment is unjustified and the question of identity (defining who
is a member of this group) are critical to a political movement.2'
Translating membership in a particular stigmatized group into a
political movement requires that (1) its members be willing to
publicly claim the identity; (2) its members organize to dispute the
stereotypes and social meaning surrounding the identity that is
imposed by the majority; and (3) ultimately, members of the group
successfully assert the prerogative to reshape the social meaning
and consequences of the identity."1
For most groups traditionally protected by antidiscrimination
law, the first step is not an issue. Although there may be
disagreement about the social meaning of a characteristic such as
race, gender, religious affiliation, or sexual preference, a substantial
degree of social consensus both within and outside the group exists
as to whether any given individual is a member of the group. By
contrast, the question of who does or does not have a psychiatric
disability is a highly contested one on both individual and systemic
levels.22 There is even some debate about whether mental illness
exists as a medical or biological condition.'
Even if an individual claims identity within the group of people
with psychiatric disabilities, the question remains whether the
20. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Social Movements and Law Reform: Channeling:IdentityBased Social Movements and Public Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 419 (2001).
21. I am grateful to Ira-Burnim of the Bazelon Center on Mental Health Law for this
insight.
22. Compare CHAMBERLIN, supra note 16, DERMSOWITZ, supra note 11, GOTKIN & GOTKIN,

supranote 14, and OLSON, supra note 10 (contesting diagnoses of mental illness on individual
and systemic levels), with PAuLS. ApPELAUM, ALMOST AREVOLUTION: MENTAL HEALTH LAW
AND THE LIMITS OF CHANGE (1994), and KAYREDFIELDJAMISON, AN UNQUIET MIND: A MEMOIR
OF MOODS AND MADNESS (1997).
23. See THOMAS SzASz, THE MYTH OF MENTAL ILLNESS: FOUNDATIONS OF A THEORY OF
PERSONAL CONDUCT (1961).
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individual sees any political connection between her disability and
its social consequences. While groups whose social stigma arose on
the basis of visible characteristics have generally been more
successful in forming political movements than groups where
the unifying characteristic is invisible or deniable,24 people with
psychiatric disabilities have long represented an interesting
amalgam of both categories-unavoidable visibility in some cases,
and lifelong invisibility in others. Forty years ago, Erving Goffman
described people with a stigmatizing characteristic as either
"discredited" or "discreditable."" The discredited person assumes
that whatever characteristics make her different are evident on the
spot, and known by the community. By contrast, the discreditable
person is the person who may be able to pass, whose difference is
neither known by those present nor immediately perceivable by
them.26 Although neither Goffman nor subsequent commentators
developed the political implications of these categories,27 this Article
theorizes that the difficulties that the ex-patient movement has
had in organizing the millions of people who have suffered from
discrimination as a result of receiving psychiatric treatment, and
the related problems of identity discussed at the beginning of this
Article, result from the split between people in these two categories.
24. Some assert that the gay rights movement only gained momentum in earnest after the
AIDS epidemic forced many gay men, especially prominent gay men, into painful and
involuntary public disclosure. See Richard Lacayo, The New Gay Struggle, TIME, Oct. 26, 1998,
at 32 (linking the AIDS epidemic to the "cutting edge of gay politics").
25. ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENTOF SPOILED IDENTITY 4 (1963).
26. Id.

27. A search of LEXIS revealed five law review articles that incorporate the
"discredited/discreditable" dichotomy. See Benjamin Baez, The Supreme CourtandAffirmative
Action: NarrativesAbout Race and Justice,18 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 413 (1999) (discussing
the dichotomy as it relates to affirmative action); Dennis Chong, Values Versus Interests in
the Explanationof Social Conflict, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 2079 (1995-96) (looking at the dichotomy
in terms of law and economics); Jane Byeff Korn, Cancerand the ADA- Rethinking Disability,
74 S. CAL. L. REv. 399 (2001) (analyzing the construction of disability with an emphasis on
cancer, but including no discussion of psychiatric disabilities or the politics of an organized
group identity); Robert C. Post, The Social Foundationsof Defamation Law: Reputation and
the Constitution, 74 CAL. L. REV. 691 (1986) (discussing defamation); Note, Making Docile
Lawyers: An Essay on the Pacification of Law Students, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2027 (1998)
(discussing the experience of law students at Harvard Law School). A search of the medical
and health literature on NEXIS returned two articles that each simply explained Goffman's
theory. See Sana Love, The Involuntary Civil Commitment of Mentally Ill Persons in the
United States and Romania:A ComparativeAnalysis, 23 J. LEGAL MED. 211 (2002); Graham
Scambler, Stigma and Disease: ChangingParadigms,352 LANCET 9133 (1988).
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Experiences of stigma and discrimination, identity, and political
agendas presently vary greatly between people in the "discredited"
and "discreditable" categories. Ultimately, social structures play
each group off the other, rendering both categories politically
weaker than they would be if they were to unite and proceed as one
bloc of millions of people.
Yet, the worlds of the discredited and the discreditable have much
more in common than either might imagine. If people from both
worlds could come together, they would constitute a potent political
force. In Part I, I examine and describe the two worlds of people
with psychiatric disabilities. I will compare and contrast their
perspectives, their literature, and their goals. In Part II, I consider
the significant social and political consequences of the dichotomy
between the world of the discredited and the world of the
discreditable. In Part III, I briefly discuss whether this apparent
dichotomy is characteristic of all such groups. I conclude by offering
a theory that unifies these apparently diametrically opposed groups,
and suggest strategies that would enable them to combine to create
a political force unlike any that has previously existed.
I. "DISCREDITED" AND "DISCREDITABLE": THE Two WORLDS OF
PEOPLE WITH PSYCHIATRIC DISABILITIES
Erving Goffman differentiated between people whose stigmatizing
features are public knowledge-the discredited-and people who
can conceal their stigmatizing characteristic-the discreditable.2" A
discredited person is one who has ended up being what Sue Estroff
called "a full-time crazy person.
The political movement by people with psychiatric disabilities has
largely been organized on behalf of the discredited. 0 Members and
opponents of the ex-patient movement understand the movement as
representing people whose conditions are unavoidably subjects of
public policy, because they are in public hospitals, clients of the
public mental health system, or receiving government disability
benefits. When psychiatrists decried the effort to establish a right
28. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
29. SUE E. ESTROFF, MAKING IT CRAZY: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF PSYCHIATRIC CLIENTS IN AN

AMEIucAN COMMUNITY 255 (1981).
30. See infra note 37 and accompanying text.
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to refuse treatment as leading to patients "rotting with their rights
on," they certainly were not describing upper middle class and
wealthy patients in private hospitals. 31 The books written by upper
middle class people about their experiences with mental illness in
the private sector reflect the unquestioned assumption, shared by
their mental health professionals, that they had the right to make
treatment decisions, including treatment refusal.3 2 In An Unquiet
Mind, Kay Redfield Jamison, a professor of psychiatry with bipolar
disorder, reproduces her doctor's notes: "Patient has elected to
resume lithium.... Patient has stopped lithium again.... Patient is
not taking lithium.... Patient has resumed lithium. 3 3 Although her
psychiatrist observed the serious and adverse consequences of
Jamison's decision to stop taking medication, he did not tell her that
she was rotting with her rights on, or make any move to force her to
take lithium. 34 Thus, the ex-patient movement's concern with
minimizing or halting forced psychiatric treatment 35 is essentially
irrelevant to the millions of people who are discreditable.
The ex-patient movement is also focused on substandard state
institutional conditions,3 6 which discreditable people will never
experience. The ex-patient movement protests the abuses of
seclusion and restraint, injury, and death at the hands of
institutional workers .3 7 These issues barely exist for people who are
discreditable. The people who lead the ex-patient movement are
people who once were discredited, recovered, and could have made
the leap from discredited to discreditable by passing as nondisabled.
Instead, their experiences have led them to champion the cause of
their discredited brothers and sisters.38
31. Paul S. Appelbaum & Thomas G. Gutheil, "Rotting with Their Rights On".
ConstitutionalTheory and ClinicalReality in Drug Refusal by PsychiatricPatients,7 BULL.
AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 306 (1979).
32. See, e.g., JAMISON, supra note 22, at 100-01.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 102-03.
35. The Internet sites of the leading organizations of the ex-patient movement concentrate
on eliminating forced treatment. See MindFreedom Online, at http'www.mindfreedom.org
(last visited Jan. 29, 2003); MadNation: People Working Together for Social Justice and
Human Rights in Mental Health, at http/www.madnation.cc (last visited Jan. 29, 2003);
National Empowerment Center, at http://www.power2u.org (last visited Jan. 29, 2003).
36. See CHAMBERLIN, supra note 16; GOTKIN & GOTIUN, supra note 14.
37. See sources cited supra note 35.
38. Psychiatrist Daniel Fisher helped to found the National Empowerment Center
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The world of discreditable people with psychiatric disabilities is
both much larger and much less visible than the world of discredited
people. People who are discreditable have psychiatric disabilities,
but they are not represented by mental health lawyers in civil rights
cases. When researchers and scholars study and discuss mental
illness, they rarely, if ever, study people who are discreditable.
Although millions of the discreditable suffer a great deal of
discrimination, they prefer to stay out of political activity identified
with issues relating to mental illness. Unlike people with physical
disabilities, not one well-known discreditable person testified before
Congress at hearings on the ADA, nor have they testified to state
legislatures.
People with diagnoses of severe psychiatric disability who are
discreditable are not organized into any significant political
movement. Indeed, their frame of reference regarding their
experiences with psychiatric disability virtually ensures that they
rarely see it as raising political issues at all. To the extent that
discreditable persons who have gone public have concerns that could
be described as political, they revolve around the impact of stigma
on career and family, and discrimination in insurance coverage,
professional education, and licensing. To the extent that they have
organizations at all, their organizations, like the Depression and
Bipolar Support Alliance, concentrate on medical issues, such as the
use of placebos in research, or on insurance parity. 9 Sometimes,
4
however, they are willing to tell their stories to the media. 0
For the most part, we know people who are discreditable as
people with psychiatric disabilities only when they choose to come
forward, which they generally do individually, primarily through
books and magazine articles. Their literature is substantial: a series
because of his experiences as a patient in the mental health system. See httpJ/www.

power2U.org/who.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2003). Dr. Patricia Dugan, a psychologist, has
similarly devoted her life to exposing ways in which the mental health system can damage

patients. See www.bu.edu/resilience/examples/recovery-conspiracyofliope.txt (last visited Jan.
24,2003).
39. For more information, see http-J/www.ndmda.org (last visited Jan. 18, 2003).
40. See, e.g., Oliver Poole, "Curse? It's the Luck of Superman" "I have nothing to hide now.
Once you have been labelled as the outcast ofsociety, you have nowhere togo but up," LONDON

DAILY TELEGRAPH, Dec. 9,2002, at 13 (interview with Margot Kidder); Alex Treniowski et al.,
FindingDaylightNFL StarRicky Williams BreaksFree of the Anxiety that Nearly Ruined His

Life, PEOPLE, Oct. 7, 2002, at 103.
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of books over the last twenty years or so by people of greater or
lesser degrees of fame and accomplishment detail their struggles
with and eventual recovery from mental illness.' 1 These authors
publish their books after recovery and recount stories that are
relentlessly medical and apolitical on talk show interviews.
These two worlds of discredited and discreditable people with
psychiatric diagnoses appear to exist in virtually parallel universes
with no apparent intersections. In fact, the discreditable world is, by
definition, largely invisible. People who are discreditable emerge to
tell their stories voluntarily, in their own time and on their own
terms. Because the experiences of discreditable people with
psychiatric disabilities are at odds with our social and legal
understanding of disability and discrimination, their experiences
are erased and unaccounted for in research about mental illness,
academia, and in case law. Despite the popularity of the literature
of discreditable people, they are never considered to be part of the
group society calls "the mentally ill." When the media reports that
someone with a history of mental illness has committed an act of
violence, one rarely associates the offender to Buzz Aldrin, 2 Kay
Redfield Jamison," William Styron," Patty Duke,' Mike Wallace,46
Rod Steiger,"7 or any of the myriad other celebrities who have
courageously and candidly recounted their experiences with
emotional crises and disabilities.
This absence creates a profound failure to understand both the
nature of psychiatric disability and the nature of discrimination
against people with psychiatric disabilities. Until these
misunderstandings are corrected, the political movement for people
with psychiatric disabilities will gain little ground.

41. See generally CRONmTE, supra note 13; NORMAN S. ENDLER, HOLIDAY OF DARKNESS:
A PSYCHOLOGIST'S PERSONAL JOURNEY OUT OF HIS DEPRESSION (Rev. ed. 1990); JAMISON,
supra note 22; MARTHA MANNING, UNDERCURRENTS: A LIFE BENEATH THE SURFACE (1994);
ANDREW SOLOMON, THE NOONDAY DEMON: AN ATnAB OF DEPRESSION (2001); STYRON, supra
note 18; TRACY THOMPSON, THE BEAs'f. A RECKONING WITH DmRSION (1995).
42. See EDWIN E. uBUZz ALDRIN, RETURN TO EARTH (1973).
43. See JAMISON, supra note 22.
44. See STYRON, supra note 18.
45. See PATTY Duxz & GLORIA HOCHMAN, A BRILIIANT MADNESS: LIvING WITH MANIC
DEPRESSIVE ILLNESS (1993).
46. See CRONIE, supra note 13, at 14-20.
47. See id. at 46-48.
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It is important to note that the distinctions between discredited
and discreditable individuals do not arise from differences in
severity of diagnosis, symptomatology, or bizarreness of behavior.
Like the discredited, discreditable people have hallucinations and
delusions, attempt suicide, cut themselves, have multiple personalities, and experience mania and hospitalization. Although it is a
common belief that well-known professionals who have suffered
from debilitating psychiatric problems, such as Rod Steiger, Mike
Wallace, William Styron, and Kay Jamison, could not really have
been as badly off as the person blankly watching television day after
day in the state hospital, their accounts tell a different story. Mike
Wallace recounts watching the sky shake," and Rod Steiger reports
clawing his skin and pounding on the wall for three days.49
It would also be misleading to assume that the primary
distinctions between the first world (the discreditable) and the
second world (the discredited) are class and economics. The fact that
children of the upper middle class become members of the first
world was one of the chief reasons that their parents formed the
National Alliance for the Mentally fll. The best known advocates
and spokespeople for the first world come from middle class and
upper middle class families. David Oaks, a leader of the ex-patient
movement, was radicalized by involuntary commitment and
treatment while he was at Harvard (although he came to Harvard
from a working class family with a strong union/labor background).
By the same token, thousands of poor and lower class people with
severe psychiatric disabilities toil and pass every day in minimum
wage jobs.
If the distinction between the two worlds is definitely not one of
symptomatology or behavior, and not principally one of class, what
is the source of the distinction? I can only speculate. Years of
research have led me to the following conclusions.
First, race is relevant to one's perspectives on emotional
difficulties. In a fascinating study by Sue Estroff and her colleagues,
people who were considered to be "chronically mentally ill" were
asked for their interpretations of the condition that had resulted in
repeated hospitalizations. Just under half of the white men and
48. Id. at 17.
49. Id. at 46.
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women and black women reported that they had an illness; only
four percent of black men considered themselves ill.50 All of the
books and articles written from the discreditable point of view are
written by white people. People of color write uniformly from the
discredited perspective.
Second, the autobiographical literature suggests that the attitude
of a troubled individual's parents and the treatments they seek for
their children make an enormous difference. I am not suggesting
that we return to the world of schizophrenogenic mothers, but one
has only to contrast the tales of women who were sexually abused
by their fathers, stepfathers, or other relatives, with the accounts of
Kay Redfield Jamison, Tracy Thompson, and other successful
professionals who recite their parents' love, patience, and enduring
support, to at least wonder whether this may not make a decisive
difference.
Third, mainstream employment tends to be a distinguishing
feature of people in the first world. This is not to say that people in
the second world cannot handle employment, even difficult, stressful
employment. Many people in the second world are employed, but
their employment tends to mirror their primary identity as
consumers of mental health services. They are the "consumer"
representatives in state government, in managed care companies,
in departments of mental health. They receive grants to run drop-in
centers and coordinate conferences. Rarely, they are scholars who
research and study people with psychiatric disabilities;5 ' or
attorneys who represent people with psychiatric disabilities.52
By far the greatest determinant, however, is the experience of
force. Discredited people write of "being stripped and locked in a
cold room or being beaten during physical restraint,"53 or of being
50. See Sue Estroff et al., Everybody's Got a Little Mental Illness:Accounts of Illness and
Self Among People with Severe PersistentMental Illness, 5 MED. ANTHROPOLOGY Q. 331

(1991).
51. Professor Jean Campbell has done pathbreaking research on people with psychiatric
disabilities. See, e.g., Jean Campbell & Caroline L. Kaufman, Equalityand Difference in the
ADA UnintendedConsequences for Employment of People with Mental Health Disability,in
MENTAL DISORDER, WORK DISABIxLY, AND THE LAw 221 (Richard J. Bonnie & John Monohan

eds., 1997).
52. Jeannie Matulis, an attorney formerly employed by the California Protection and

Advocacy System, is one example.
53. Corn Kalinowski & Pat Risser, Identifying and Overcoming Mentalism, in INFORMED

PUBLISHING AND TRAINING 1, available at http'/home.att.net/-PatRisser/spirituality/
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[sexually] molested on the psychiatric unit."' One discredited
person explained:
[Tihey took me to the "quiet room" and they ripped my clothes
off, and they stuck me in the bum with needles very painfully
and roughly because I was struggling to get away from them....
I was tied to the bed naked, and then they left me in the dark
with these drugs happening that they had injected in me, and I
was terrified.55
It is the dehumanizing and traumatizing impact of force, often
administered by mental health aides and professionals who are
supposed to help and treat, that is at the core of the anger and
disillusionment of the movement by discredited people. According
to David Oaks, "[tihe identity of psychiatric survivors is as
experiencers of human rights violations."56 This experience of force
communicates and reinforces their diminished status and stigma,
their powerlessness to resist indignities and bodily intrusion, their
lack of credibility, and the futility of complaint. No one would strap
down Mike Wallace and inject him with Haldol in his buttocks, no
matter how bizarrely he was behaving. For the most part, this is
because people with celebrity and high income can maintain an
enormous private realm that insulates and erases their erratic
behavior from public view. When a celebrity behaves bizarrely in
public, and attributes a political rather than a medical meaning to
the treatment received, the media coverage is almost comically
uncertain.
The stories of discreditable people, though vivid with the
emotional suffering associated with psychiatric disability, contain
no references to force or coercion, and in fact virtually uniformly
identify the mental health professionals who treated them as allies,
sometimes indispensable allies.

identifyingmentalism.htnl (last visited Feb. 6, 2003).
54. Laura Prescott, Women Emerging in the Wake of Violence, in PROToTYPES SYSTEM

CHANGE CENTER 13 (1998).
55. Barbara Everett, Something is Happening: The Contemporary Consumer and
PsychiatricSurvivor Movement in Historical Context, 15 J. MIND & BEHAV. 55, 62 (1994)
(quoting participant in radio broadcast hosted by Irit Shirifat (CBC Radio 1989)).
56. E-mail from David Oaks to Susan Stefan (July 22, 2002) (on file with author).
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I came upon the distinctions between these two groups of people
by accident. In writing a book about discrimination against people
with psychiatric disabilities, I decided to conduct a survey of people
who perceived themselves as psychiatrically disabled, who*had a
diagnosis of serious mental illness, or who thought others perceived
them as psychiatrically disabled.5" The survey asked people if they
believed they had been discriminated against, and if so, on what
basis and in what areas of life." I conducted this survey by
distributing it through a wide variety of networks that I thought
would tap the full spectrum of people with psychiatric disabilities.
I sent it to fifty-one protection and advocacy agencies, 9 which
provide legal and advocacy services for people with psychiatric
disabilities in institutions and in the community, I sent it to a
number of groups such as the Mental Health Association, the
National Alliance for the Mentally Ill, and the National ManicDepressive Association. I sent it to ex-patient support groups,
distributed it at mental health conferences, and most importantly
for the results I will be discussing, posted it on the Internet. In my
attempt to make the survey as widely available as possible, I
essentially concentrated on outlets serving people who are discredited.
I expected the surveys to reflect stories that constituted
discrimination according to my understanding of it as both a lawyer
and a citizen: exclusion, underestimation of abilities and strengths,
and stigma associated with stereotypes such as dangerousness or
violence. In fact, the surveys reflected many accounts of precisely
this kind of devaluation: termination of parental rights or loss of
57. I received a total of 408 responses over the two and a half years that the survey was
available. Of these, eleven were incomplete. I used the answers that they had included. One
was from Australia and six reported only physical disabilities. I received relatively few
responses that some might consider garbled or delusional. I included these responses in the
survey data.
58. I have appended a copy of the survey to this Article.
59. In 1986, Congress passed the Protection and Advocacy for Mentally III Individuals Act,
which provided federal funds for legal aid to persons who suffered from abuse and neglect in
psychiatric institutions, or within ninety days of discharge. See Pub. L. No. 99-319, 100 Stat.
478 (1986). The Act has since been renamed the Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with
Mental Illness Act, and its scope has been broadened to include individuals with psychiatric
disabilities in the community. 42 U.S.C. § 10801 (2000); see also Children's Health Act of
2000, Pub. L. No. 106-310, 114 Stat. 1101 (2000) (amending the statute to reflect the name
change).

1358

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:1341

6
access to children because of a diagnosis of mental illness; 0
termination of employment upon discovery that the individual had
a history of hospitalization or was taking medications;61 rejection by
schools, 2 landlords,' churches," and families; mistreatment by the
medical system, especially emergency treatment;' and rejection by
insurance companies." These traditional stories of discrimination
involved people insisting on their ability to raise children, compete
in employment, be part of the congregation, succeed in school, and
generally be equal members of the social and political community in
the face of assumptions and stereotypes that magnified their
diagnoses and ignored their strengths. In large part, these people
did not want accommodations for their disability. They simply
wanted to be treated equally-to be allowed to stay in rental
housing because they paid the rent and were good tenants, rather
than being evicted because the landlord was afraid that mentally ill
people set fires; to be allowed to worship in the congregations of
their faith rather than being ejected because their voices were
characterized as demons; to be allowed to study, work, or be part of

60. STFAN SuRVwY No. 24; id. No. 263 (stating that the worst discrimination experienced
was "loss of access to my kids").
61. Id. No. 104; id. No. 283.
62. Id. No. 112; id. No. 115; id. No. 130; id. No. 145 (stating that, after being committed
to a psychiatric unit, the student was barred from returning to student housing and was not
permitted to retrieve belongings from the dormitory room); id. No. 186 (stating respondent
was "denied entrance to graduate psychology program shortly after interview with
department head when I openly mentioned I had psychotherapy").
63. Id. No. 6; id. No. 13.
64. Id. No. 17; id. No. 41 (stating that respondent was rejected by church because
respondent's voices were considered "demons").
65. One respondent reported:
[Wihen I was) taken to the emergency room for a physical emergency, ... the Dr.
demanded to perform a psychiatric exam before releasing me, intercepted a call
between my psychiatrist & me, insisted that the advocate who was with me
leave the examining room or he would not do the psychiatric exam .... I was
overmedicated because those in charge didn't believe that I knew about my
disorder and about how medications affect me-Ifyou have a mental illness, you
must also be childish & unreliable, unpredictable, unknowledgable.
Id. No. 248.
66. Id No. 269 ("[MKy husband wanted to take out insurance on me; & the agent said we
couldn't because of my mental illness. I thought this isn't fair-I was really angry."); id. No.
274 ("111 nsurance not covering psychiatric (a biological disease) treatment, therapy and meds
as other illnesses").
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a community without being treated with suspicion, hostility, or
wariness.
These accounts also often revealed that the worst discrimination
that respondents suffered was the treatment they received at the
hands of mental health professionals and psychiatric hospitals. The
stories were written with an anger, bitterness, and eloquence that
leapt off the page:
On the basis of my EX-fiance's assertions, I was
HANDCUFFED, LOCKED UP, and treated as though I was an
imbecile not worth communicating with. In fact, I have a
university degree in math, never lost my intellect, never lost
touch with reality-I was sad and overwhelmed by horrendous
life events .... I was also at that time locked up in an "isolation"
cell-and was told after so sorry, it had nothing to do with me,
it was simply normal procedure for everyone. Is this supposed to
be therapeutic? What sense is there in taking someone
emotionally distressed and severely traumatizing them? I will
never ask for help of the psychiatric profession because I no
longer trust them. They are the LAST people I would tell if I
were depressed. That scares me, too-not being able to trust
people for help.67
Another account answered a question about the
discrimination experienced by the respondent as follows:

worst

In the mental health area, forced detention in a psychiatric
hospital. Made me lose my job, also forced to take neuroleptics
threatened with physical violence if I did not take them. Also I
was TORTURED with sleep deprivation when I refused to take
neuroleptics by the staff banging loudly on my door and yelling
loudly room check every fifteen minutes which made me
physically sick and I suffered emotional distress."
Yet another individual responded:
I was discriminated against in mental hell-th treatment .... The
[mental health professionals] label [my] exhaustion"depression"
67. Id. No. 164.
68. Id. No. 142.
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because they're too dishonest to admit they're threatening
survivors with a seemingly unlimited array of forced
"treatments" which are nothing but assault, and those threats
have the same effect on me as the snowmobiles that run wolves
to exhaustion.... I've sat in the courtroom while a judge decided
that a man was innocent of rape because the young girl he'd
raped was in psychiatric treatment and therefore thejudge could
not be sure she had refused sex. So that means once I'm labelled,
anyone can do anything to me, because my word will not be
accepted in court.6 9
These accounts of discrimination are reminiscent of accounts of
rape, sexual assault, beatings, and lynchings based on gender and
race discrimination: the use of brute force to enforce a dominant
political hierarchy against stirrings of resistance. For most of
society, accustomed to the image of voluntary interactions with
sympathetic therapists, the analogy would seem absurd. As
mentioned above, however, this analogy goes far to answer the
questions about identity asked at the beginning of this Article.
These accounts of "traditional" discrimination and forcible
commitment and treatment amounted to just more than half of the
responses I received. What I had not expected was that nearly an
equal number of people identified their experiences with
discrimination in what seemed to be precisely the opposite way.
Virtually all of these "different" responses were submitted in
response to the Internet posting, and many came from people
currently employed as lawyers, social workers, academics, and in
other professional fields. These respondents experienced
discrimination as the failure of others to take seriously their reports
of suffering and difficulty. Their experience of discrimination was of
being treated as an ordinary, normal person who was oversensitive
or subject to hypochondria. They were told to cheer up, to stop being
lazy, or to stop goldbricking. For example, one survey respondent
wrote:
I've tried to "cure myself" in many ways and some people still
believe if I would only "get to the bottom of my neurosis" I would
be "normal." I am not a passive person. I am not lazy. We are
69. Id. by V.B. (on file with author).
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just like normal people, except for the ways our brains work, not
violent, not cruel, usually more scared than anything else. 0
Another told of her husband's family's suggestion that she put
pressure on her depressed husband to shape up:
[Wihen my husband was unable to work due to mental health
problems his family refused to acknowledge his inability to hold
a job and at one point requested that I threaten to leave him so
that he would go to work. When I refused, they became angry at
me .... There were several incidents where family and my
therapist encouraged me to leave my husband because of his
mental health problems. I felt isolated and abandoned myself.
Eventually I became clinically depressed myself.71
When I read the surveys, I saw what had been before my eyes all
along: the numerous autobiographical accounts of individuals whose
families or coworkers had insisted that they were just down in the
dumps or needed a rest, 2 and my own law students' accounts of
their families' unwillingness to acknowledge that they were dealing
with more than typical first-year law student travails.73
In fact, many of the ADA employment discrimination cases that
I had been studying involved emphatic rejection by employers of
employees' reports of psychiatric disabilities.7 4 One fairly typical
account involved a grocery store employee who revealed to his
manager that he suffered from clinical depression. Shortly thereafter, the manager and the district manager

70. Id. No. 231.
71. Id. No. 92.
72. See MANNING, supra note 41, at 75-76; THOMPSON, supra note 41, at 110-12.
73. Over ten years as a law professor, I heard numerous stories of students warned by
their families and friends not to seek professional help because it would have to be disclosed
to the Board of Bar Examiners when they sought to be admitted to practice. These stories
were so continuous and problematic that Jim Green of the ACLU and I brought a lawsuit on
behalf of three law students and a lawyer from another state that successfully challenged
questions regarding mental health treatment on bar applications. See Ellen S. v. Fla. Bd. of
Bar Examrs, 859 F. Supp. 1489 (S.D. Fla. 1994).
74. See, e.g., Steele v. Thiokol, 241 F.3d 1248, 1250 (10th Cir. 2001) (noting that when
plaintiff told his supervisor he had a psychiatric disability, the supervisor responded by
saying, "Bullshit, you do not have a disability").
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told him they did not believe he was depressed and urged him to
tell them what his real problem was. [The district manager] told
[the plaintiffl, "you're within a gnat's ass of losing your job,
what's really your problem?"... [Tihe managers threatened him
with termination and accused him of lying about the extent of
his depression."5
In another case, a federal court reasoned that when a person with
a psychiatric disability claimed harassment based on his disability,
the supervisor's failure to intervene because he believed the
employee could handle the problem on his own showed that the
supervisor did not perceive the employee as disabled.7"
Discrimination based on the defendant's refusal to believe that an
individual is a member of the protected class is an incongruous
concept for those trained in earlier formulations of antidiscrimination law. From this perspective, the cases would be equivalent to
an African American claiming race discrimination because the
employer thought he was white, .or a woman claiming sex discrimination because the employer believed she was a man. These
stories find no home in the social understanding of discrimination,
or in traditional antidiscrimination jurisprudence. The principles of
antidiscrimination law assert that people should be treated equally,
and that differences such as race, and, to a lesser extent, sex, are
not salient and should be ignored." Treating a person's age,
ethnicity, or religion as relevant to his or her ability to profit from
education or to perform capably in employment is seen as discriminatory.7"
To insist on difference in the face of social assertions that do not
exist, and to characterize those assertions as discriminatory, thus
flies in the face of our most fundamental understanding of the
75. Lee v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., No. 95-40474-RH, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8921, at
*4-5 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 16, 1998) (citations omitted).
76. Mork v. Manpower, Inc., No. 97 C 4866, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11312, at *14 (N.D. Ill.
July 23, 1998) (holding that [i f anything, their inaction suggests the opposite: that Mork's
supervisors believed he was fully capable of taking care of himself and resolving any conflicts
with his co-workers").
77. CompareAdarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 222 (1995) (deciding that
race-based classifications should receive the most searching judicial examination), with
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515,531 (1996) (requiring gender-based government action
be supported by an "exceedingly persuasive justification").
78. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(aXi) (2000); id. § 2000d.
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meaning of discrimination. In a larger sense, of course, this is one
of the major problems with implementing the ADA: Its recognition
of difference and mandate that reasonable accommodations be
provided as a prerequisite for equality places it outside traditional
antidiscrimination jurisprudence. This is especially the case for
people with certain kinds of invisible disabilities. The social
perspective that these people are the same as anyone else dooms
their legal claims of discrimination, both their claims that they
actually were disabled and their claims that they were perceived as
disabled.
At first, examining these two accounts of discrimination in my
surveys, I was struck by the distinctions between them, and the
different issues each group faced. I attempted to come up with a
structure to categorize these differences in order to better
understand these accounts of discrimination. The crucial differences
that separate the two groups, the discredited and discreditable,
appeared to fall into five major categories.
A. Identity and Disclosure
The group of people who told the traditional discrimination story
of being marginalized and excluded were, for the most part,
discredited people who were publicly, visibly labeled as mentally ill;
they were either institutionalized in a state facility, clients of the
public mental health system, or recipients of disability payments. In
the eyes of most people, they were grouped with, or, to be blunt,
segregated with other people with psychiatric disabilities.
These discredited people rarely struggled with disclosure of their
psychiatric difficulties. They recounted their difficulties and
experiences based on a premise that all the significant people in
their lives, as well as society, represented by government agencies,
police, and social service workers, were not only fully aware of their
psychiatric disabilities, but were unable to see them as anything but
a collection of symptoms or as a diagnosis. Their identity as
psychiatrically disabled swallowed all other aspects of who they
were-their sexuality, their religious identity, and their racial or
ethnic identity. Their struggle was to be seen as more than simply
a diagnostic category.
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Conversely, disclosure was a crucial issue for the group of people
whose sufferings were ignored-the group I now identify as
discreditable. They tended to be employed in competitive jobs, to use
private mental health professionals, and to have mainstream social
networks. Although they had obviously disclosed their conditions to
some people and thereby suffered the discrediting of their accounts
of discrimination, their survey responses frequently made reference
to issues of disclosure and nondisclosure. When asked, "What do you
want other people to know about psychiatric disability, perceptions
of psychiatric disability, discrimination, or law ...?", many people
urgently warned others not to disclose their diagnoses.
The concern of the survey respondents with disclosure is
reflected in both the national media and case law. Many literary
and news accounts testify to the considerable lengths to which some
people with psychiatric disabilities will go to keep their conditions
secret from their colleagues, friends, and even their families. An
article in Newsweek described businessmen who borrowed their
secretaries' cars to go to appointments with their therapists and
paid for the appointments in cash. 9 Disclosure is frightening
because of the potential for social ostracism and exclusion. It can
have real effects on employment, educational and professional
opportunities, child custody, and medical care.
Of course, this dichotomy corresponds to Goffman's predictions
that discredited people struggle with "impression management"
whereas discreditable people focus on "information management."
For discreditable people, "passing" among "normal" people becomes
the crucial task of managing stigma.'
B. Identity and Segregation
One of the reasons that disclosure is perceived as perilous by
some people with psychiatric disabilities is the possible consequence
of involuntary institutionalization. The stigma of institutionalization, so great that Erving Goffman concluded that it "spoiled"
the identity of the institutionalized person,"' is still one that is
rigidly enforced by social norms and social legislation. For many
79. Jolie Solomon et al., Breaking the Silence, NEWSWEEK, May 20, 1996, at 20.
80. GOFFMAN, supra note 25, at 42.

81. Id. at 51-62.
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people with psychiatric disabilities, the experience of institutionalization, especially involuntary institutionalization in a state
psychiatric facility, represents a key dividing line with respect to
identity and one of the first steps toward being discredited. Often,
disclosure is no longer an issue. Institutionalization leads to loss of
housing, loss of employment, difficulty obtaining new employment,
and thus a seemingly inevitable new career as a mental patient, a
client of the state mental health system. This new identity is in turn
crucial to receiving housing, transportation assistance, health care
benefits, and public services. Individuals associate with providers
and other people who are clients of the state mental health system.
One reason that discredited people live such disclosed and public
lives is that many of them are part of the public mental health
system, and most have a history of involuntary institutionalization.
One cannot underestimate the significance of institutions created
specifically for people with mental disabilities. State institutions for
people with mental disabilities were usually built explicitly to keep
persons with mental disabilities out of society. 2 Far from the
concept of "asylum" envisioned by early reformers, institutions have
been the sites of experimentation, forced labor, deaths in restraints,
sexual assault, and dehumanizing treatment.'
In fact, one measure of the degree to which society dreads and
rejects a particular disability or identity is whether it builds
institutions or structures in which to isolate people with that
condition from the rest of society. These institutions may vary from
explicitly murderous to callously indifferent, but all serve the
purpose of segregation. From leper colonies to internment camps to
institutions for mental retardation where researchers conduct
radiation experiments on children, 4 it is infallibly a mark of
82. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr. Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 462 (1985) (Marshall, J.,
concurring) ("Massive custodial institutions were built to warehouse the retarded for life; the
aim was to halt reproduction of the retarded and 'nearly extinguish their race."') (citation
omitted). The same is true of institutions for people considered to be mentally ill. See DAVID
ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM: SOCIAL ORDER AND DISORDER IN THE NEW

REPUBLIC (1971).
83. See SUSAN STEFAN, UNEQUAL RIGHTS: DISCRIMINATION AGAINST PEOPLE WITH MENTAL
DISABILITEs AND THE AMERICANS WITH DisABnxnms ACT 107-10 (2001).

84. Michael J. Loscialpo, Nontherapeutic Research Experiments on Institutionalized
Mentally Retarded Children: Civil Rights and Remedies, 23 NEW ENG. J. CRIM. & CIrV.
CONFINEMENT 139 (1997).
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increasing stigma when institutions are created to segregate people
from society, and correspondingly, decreasing stigma is reflected
when the institutions are eradicated and people are once more
allowed to live among us. People with epilepsy and tuberculosis
used to be routinely institutionalized, and now, for the most part,
they are not.8 5 Several states have closed all their institutions for
people with mental retardation, but forty-nine states still have state
mental hospitals."
People who are discreditable are integrated into society; they
"pass," and they explicitly identify institutionalization as the rite of
passage into the world of the discredited, a dreaded event to be
avoided at all costs. Journalist Mike Wallace, who has written a
candid account of his own struggle with psychiatric difficulties, put
it succinctly: "For years, depression meant the crazy house." 1
William Styron reported: "[My psychiatrist] told me once or twice
during out sessions (and after I had rather hesitantly broached the
possibility of hospitalization) that I should try to avoid the hospital
at all costs, owing to the stigma I might suffer."" When Martha
Manning, a psychologist, decided she needed ECT for her
depression, and discovered that her insurance company would only
cover the treatments on an inpatient basis, her reaction was, "I can't
go into the hospital. I just can't. 8 She forced herself to at least visit
the unit, where she saw her name on a patients' bulletin board. She
went on to describe her reaction:
I panic and can't quite catch my breath. I tear out of the place,
through the double doors, down strange-smelling halls, and
85. When the Supreme Court decided Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972), Indiana's
commitment statutes, like those of many other states, permitted involuntary commitment of
people with epilepsy. Id. at 822. In Bell u. Wayne County, 384 F. Supp. 1085 (E.D. Mich. 1974),
the court noted that "Michigan employs three standards for civil commitment: mental illness,
mental handicap, and epilepsy." Id. at 1095 n.8. Almost all states have deleted epilepsy from
the list of conditions for which a person can be involuntarily institutionalized. At least four
states-Florida, Arizona, New Jersey, and West Virginia, as well as New York City-permit
involuntary institutionalization of a person with tuberculosis. See STEPAN, supra note 83, at
127-32
86. Only Rhode Island no longer has a state psychiatric hospital. See the National
Association of State Mental Health Program Directors, at http'J/vww.nasmhpd.org/
hlsthtml.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2003).
87. CRONKITE, supra note 13, at 17.

88. STYRON, supra note 18, at 67-68.
89. MANNING, supra note 41, at 111.
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finally through an exit door. I climb into my car, lock all the
doors, and try to calm myself. I resolve to avoid the hospital at
all costs. I will handle my problems. It is a matter of
determination. I will make it work. The most important thing is
that I am free-to walk out, to drive home, and never to return.90
C. Identity and Coercion
Despite this basic understanding of the terror of involuntary
hospitalization, neither Manning nor the millions of potentially
discreditable others in her situation have made coercion a priority
issue in mental health care, nor is the experience of coercion a significant part of their identity as people with psychiatric problems.
Discreditable people seem to ignore or avoid their own brushes
with coercion. An individual who works for a major Midwestern
university described his first hospitalization:
I was feeling really bad and I called up the EAP [Employee
Assistance Program] at the University to see if there was anyone
I could talk to. They said no, but I can't remember if they put me
through to the police or to the hospital, but somehow a
university police officer took me to the psych ER at the
[university] hospital.9
This individual believed that the police officer gave him no choice
but to go to the emergency room, but he also stated that he did not
feel coerced.92
When discreditable people end up in coercive situations in which
they feel oppressed and wronged, their reaction is often to blame it
on the individuals involved, rather than generalize the episode as
typical of the mental health system. People who do not generalize
in this way may become outraged, but they rarely become politicized.
It seems fairly obvious that people rarely make a specific choice
to become discredited, to be part of the public mental health system.
The path to being a discredited person is filled with milestones of
identity which are tremendously stressful and significant, and
90. Id.
91. Interview with KE. (Mar. 15, 2002) (on file with author).
92. Id.
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which are almost always brought about by well-meaning family
members, friends, and professional helpers. Thus, informal, wellmeaning coercion often leads to coercion formalized by legal status
and court orders. Sue Estroff writes of the determinants of the
decision to seek disability benefits on the basis of psychiatric
disability. 93 Her research confirms my anecdotal experience that the
decision to apply for disability benefits is rarely made by an
individual alone, but rather is encouraged, and sometimes coerced,
by either family members or the mental health system. Estroff and
her colleagues found that neither diagnosis, severity of symptoms,
nor even work history was predictive of the decision to apply for
disability benefits.9 Rather, they found that people who applied for
benefits were "urged to apply or assisted with application" by
hospital workers and family members, and they conclude:
Our view is that for the most part, application for SSI/SSDI is
something that happened to respondents, not with their help or
by their initiative. Pragmatic rather than clinical or more
philosophical concerns drive the process, and what this move
means to the individual in terms of stigma, loss of self-esteem or
giving up is less important at the time than the material
resources that SSI/SSDI can provide for applicants and their
social network members. 95
The discredited are often sharply aware of the coercion associated
with their experiences of psychiatric disability. Because of their
experiences with involuntary commitment and institutionalization,
discredited people are deeply suspicious of the mental health system
and consider the diagnostic system one of labeling that does the
unfortunate recipient more harm than good.
Discreditable people, on the other hand, have not been coerced.
They have been told, and they believe, that their problems are
biological rather than political. They regard mental health
professionals as their allies. They believe in medication, although
the level of this belief has been exaggerated. William Styron was
93. Sue E. Estroffet al., 'NoOther Way to Go': Pathwaysto DisabilityIncome Application
among Personswith Severe Persistent Mental Illness, in MENTAL DisoRDER,WoRK DISABJITY,

AND THE LAW 55 (Richard J. Bonnie & John Monahan eds., 1997).
94. Id. at 92.
95. Id.

20031

"DISCREDITED" AND "DISCREDITABLE"

1369

attacked after he reported that the drug Halcion contributed to his
suicidal tendencies." Kay Jamison acknowledges that medications
dull her experience of the world.' For that matter, many discredited
people find some medications helpful; their chief complaint is being
forced to take medications that do not help them. Haldol, Prolixin,
and Thorazine figure chiefly among medications that are feared,
hated, and forced on discredited people. Interestingly, my anecdotal
experience is that these medications are rarely, if ever, prescribed
for people who have choices about the medications they take.
D. Identity and Literature
The literature of each world reflects these different perspectives.
Virtually all ex-patient literature, whether discredited or
discreditable, revolves around the authors' experiences with
psychiatric disability, diagnosis, and treatment, but the authors'
reactions to this treatment and their conclusions are distinctly
different.
The literature of discredited persons is the literature of the public
mental health system. Judi Chamberlin's On Our Own and Janet
and Paul Gotkin's Too Much Anger, Too Many Tears recount the
emotional turmoil of two upper middle class American women
whose experiences take them first to private hospitals, and then to
state facilities. These books are beautifully written, classic examples
of an understanding of the mental health system as political, and an
identification with others who are trapped in it. These authors
angrily and eloquently blame psychiatrists and the mental health
system for misunderstanding their needs and damaging rather than
helping them. Both conclude that people with psychiatric
disabilities are better off receiving help and support from peers
rather than from the established mental health system. As Janet
and Paul Gotkin write in their introduction:
Our own book, and the ideas behind it, grew out of our
involvement with what was called, in the language of the times,

the Mental Patients Liberation Movement. This was a loose
federation of former "mental patients," who believed, as we did,
96. STYRON, supra note 18, at 70.71.
97. JAMSION, supra note 22, at 94-95.
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that the institutional system was fundamentally oppressive and
that all involuntary confinement and "treatment" should be
abolished."8
On the other hand, William Styron's Darkness Visible, and Kay
Redfield Jamison's A Mind Apart, although equally eloquent and
beautifully written, are clearly intended to be stories about the
authors' own experiences rather than a call to political action. The
authors credit mental health professionals, medication, and
hospitalization with saving their lives. Although they honestly
discuss failures and mistakes in their medical treatment, and
discrimination that they experienced or feared because of having a
psychiatric diagnosis or receiving psychiatric treatment, these books
are not indictments of the present mental health system in any
sense.
Somewhere in the middle, and harder to categorize, are Sylvia
Plath's The Bell Jar, Elizabeth Wurtzel's Prozac Nation, and
Susanna Kaysen's Girl, Interrupted,each of which candidly relates
the tale of an adolescent girl who is labelled or considers herself
crazy. Each of these authors recognize the damage the mental
health system can inflict, and therefore they do not project the
gratitude and alliance with mental health professionals of authors
like Jamison and Styron. However, the disillusionment of Plath,
Wurtzel, and Kaysen does not lead them to political conclusions,
generalizations, or even action. A typical moment occurs in Girl,
Interrupted. The author describes Lisa, a girl she knew in the
hospital as defiant, oppositional, and rebellious. Lisa escaped
frequently, and was kept on one-to-one surveillance. Kaysen meets
Lisa and her child years later by chance in Harvard Square. They
speak for a few minutes. Lisa turns as she is about to leave and
says:
"You ever think of those days in there, in that place?"
"Yes," I answered. "I do think of them."
"Me too." She shook her head. "Oh, well," she said rather
jauntily. Then the two of them went down the stairs,
underground."
98. GOTKIN & GOTKIN, supra note 14, at xiv.
99. SUSANNA KAYSEN, GIRL, INTERRUPTED 164 (1993).
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Kaysen's and Plath's accounts reflect the fact that private
hospitalization can be as damaging as hospitalization in a state
facility. However, both were adolescents and theoretically voluntary
patients. Although they were undoubtedly coerced,' ° because they
were in private hospitals they did not associate the experience with
state oppression, as do discredited patients. Perhaps state action, or
state supported force and coercion, are usually necessary for an
experience in the mental health system to lead to political
organization and action.
E. Identity, Agendas, and Allies
Each group has distinct policy and political agendas. The agenda
of the discredited, who have formed the ex-patient movement,
revolves around choice and the end of coercion and force, whether
legal or hidden in state institutions. They oppose involuntary
outpatient commitment, forced electroshock, and support the
recovery model and voluntary psychosocial treatment in the
community.'0 ' In seeking alternatives to forced institutionalization,
they support legislation that would permit Medicaid money to be
used for home health care rather than nursing homes, legislation
that would make it easier to keep Medicaid benefits while employed,
and legislation limiting the use of restraints. 1 2 Their natural allies
are groups of people with physical disabilities, groups protecting the
rights of the poor, human rights groups, civil rights groups, and
senior citizens' lobbies.
To the extent that they are politically involved at all, people who
fit the discreditable model are concerned with disparity in insurance
coverage and confidentiality of mental health records. They deplore
the degree to which the stigma associated with mental illness forces
them to secrecy and deception, and may litigate when they are
excluded from institutions of higher education, professional schools,
and by licensing organizations.0 3 They often suffer from
100. Sylvia Plath's recounting of being subjected to electric shock treatments against her
will is unforgettable. SYLviA PLATH, THE BELL JAR (1971).
101. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
102. See sources cited supra note 35.
103. See SUSAN STEFAN, HOLLOw PROMISES: EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AGAINST

1372

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:1341

employment discrimination when they disclose their psychiatric
diagnoses, no matter how brilliantly they perform their jobs. 1 ' This
group resents constraints placed on psychiatric treatment by health
maintenance organizations and managed care. They want to be able
to choose therapists who can help them over the long term, and have
those therapy sessions covered by insurance. The discreditable are
concerned about the confidentiality of psychiatric records. Their
natural allies are associations of mental health professionals, who
also resent limitations on reimbursements and intrusions by
managed care.
II. THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DICHOTOMY BETWEEN
DISCREDITED AND DISCREDITABLE

The dichotomy between the discredited and discreditable, and
especially the erasure of the experiences of discreditable people in
the social understanding of mental illness, is reflected in the media
and in public opinion polls, and has extraordinarily serious policy
and legal consequences.
A. Research on Employment
Research findings on people with mental illness are almost
entirely based on studies involving only discredited people.
Statistics on the employment of people with psychiatric disabilities
are artificially low because the studies to which scholars and the
media cite are almost universally based on populations that are
easy for researchers to study-people receiving vocational
rehabilitation benefits, people recently discharged from state
psychiatric hospitals, and other clients of the public mental health
system. For example, one article states that "as many as 85% of
persons with psychiatric disabilities remain unemployed."' 5
However, the source for this dismal figure is an article about
PEOPLE WITH MENDAL DISABILTfEs 14 n.68 (2001).
104. See DEPRESSION AND BIPOLAR SUPPORT ALLIANCE, PUBLIC POLICY AND LEGISLATVE

POSITIONS, at httpA/www.ndmda.org/media/DBSAPositions.html (last visited Jan. 30,2003).
105. Edward Diksa & E. Sally Rogers, Employer Concerns About Hiring Persons with
PsychiatricDisability:Results of the EmployerAttitude Questionnaire,40 REHAB. COUNSELING
BULL. 31 (1996).
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supported employment, an intervention that many people with
diagnoses of serious psychiatric disabilities do not need to remain
employed.'0 6
As I have noted in other writings, statistics about unemployment
among people with psychiatric disabilities are fraught with
difficulty, because it is unclear from the statistics how employment
is defined ." Some studies include part-time employment, others
include volunteer jobs, state-sponsored sheltered employment, or
supported employment, and still others are limited to full-time
jobs.'O' But the more frequently cited studies, which list unemployment rates of between sixty-five and ninety percent, imply that
mental illness precludes employment. These studies are often
limited to participants in psychosocial rehabilitation programs, who
are by definition of their participation in those programs, already
discredited.1"
More reliable studies, including the Epidemiological Catchment
Area survey, which used cities such as Baltimore, St. Louis, and
Los Angeles as sources for its study, show much higher rates of
employment, marriage, and other indices of community integration.11 ° The only employment-related study I could find in which
the respondents were discreditable rather than discredited
examined the work experiences of five hundred professionals and
managers with serious psychiatric conditions."' Of the group,
seventy-three percent were employed full time, eighty-three percent
had college degrees or higher, and sixty-four percent had been
hospitalized more than three times. 2 The famous people and
celebrities who candidly discuss extremely serious episodes of
psychiatric disability are seen as exceptions, even though their
106. See William Anthony & Andrea Blanch, Supported Employment for Personswho are
PsychiatricallyDisabled"An Historicaland ConceptualPerspective,11 PSYCHOSOCIAL REHAB.
J. 5 (1987).
107. See STEFAN, supra note 103, at 12-13.

108. Id.
109. See id.
110. PSYCHIATRIC DISORDERS INAMERICA: THE EPIDEMROOGICAL CATCHMENTAREA SURVEY
(Lee N. Robins & Darrel A. Regier, eds. 1990).
111. Marsha Langer Ellison & Zlatka Russinova, A NationalSurvey of Professionalsand
Managers with PsychiatricConditions:A Portraitof Achievements and Challenges, (Center
for Psychiatric Rehabilitation, Boston, Mass. 1999), available at httpdlwww.bu.edu/
SARPSYCH/research/rtc1999/si_3.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2003).
112. Id.
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numbers are quite large. Kay Jamison,"' noted author and expert
on bipolar disorder, journalists Elizabeth Wurtzel14 and Tracy
Thompson," 5 William Styron," 6 Mike Wallace," 7 Rod Steiger,"28
20
Joan Rivers,"" Roseanne Barr, Patty Duke, Lawton Chiles,1 1
Tipper Gore,'2 2 Buzz Aldrin,' 23 and Art Buchwald 12 ' have all
reported serious bouts of mental illness, but they are not included
in studies of employment rates among people with mental illness.
B. Employment DiscriminationLitigation
The discreditable also lose-in litigation, in higher education, in
licensing-because those in authority, accustomed to an understanding of mental illness that encompasses only the discredited,
cannot fathom that a professional could be employable and
simultaneously experience serious psychiatric disabilities. The
cloak of secrecy that permits discreditable people to enter into
mainstream employment and pass as "normal" cannot be easily
shed. Almost all Title I ADA cases appear to be brought by
discreditable people who have an episode of psychiatric disability
they cannot hide. 12' Employment discrimination litigation under the
ADA routinely results in a finding that the plaintiff is not
psychiatrically disabled because she got another job after being fired
as a result of her diagnosis- disabled people presumably could not
be reemployed so easily. 126 Other judges find that plaintiffs are not
disabled by virtue of the fact that they made it into work day after

day. 127
113. See JAMISON, supra note 22.
114. See W RTZEL, supra note 13.
115. See THOMPSON, supra note 41.
116. See STYRON, supra note 18.
117. See CRONKITE, supra note 13, at 14-20.
118. See id. at 46-48.
119. Id. at 40-41.
120. ROsEANN BAR, ROSEANNE: MY LIFE ASAWOMAN (1989).
121. L.N. Strout, Politics and Mental Illness: The Campaigns of Thomas Eagleton and
Lawton Chiles, 18 J. AM. CULTURE, Fall 1995, at 67.
122. Tipper Gore, Strip Stigma from Mental Illness, USA TODAY, May 7, 1999, at 15A.
123. See ALDRIN, supra note 42.
124. ART BucHwALD, LEAVING HOME: A MEMOIR (1993).
125. See, e.g., ANDREW CHAUIKN,A MAN ON THE MOON (1994).
126. STEFAN, supra note 103.
127. Id. at 74-75, 80.
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C. Social Policy on Homelessness
The perception that mental illness leads to homelessness derives
from focusing solely on the much smaller population of discredited
people. It is probably untrue even as to them; the salient
characteristic that leads people with mental illness to homelessness
is poverty rather than the mental illness itself. If the concept of
mental illness in our society were broadened to include the
discreditable, people with serious psychiatric disabilities who pass
the misconception that severe psychiatric disability is associated
with homelessness would probably collapse.
D. Media Portrayalsof Mental Illness
Media portrayals of people with severe mental illness center on
the discredited, except on the rare occasions when celebrities reveal
their battles with the illness, who seem to instantly be regarded as
exceptions.
When people in our society speak of the mentally ill, they are
referring only to the visible second world. This has consequences not
only for the second world, but also for the first. Because the entire
array of people with psychiatric disabilities is not visible, people in
the second world are not credited with the strengths and capacities
they have. They are subject to stereotyping and mythology. It is
hard to think that mentally ill people are incapacitated or
unpredictably violent and think of Mike Wallace and Tipper Gore as
mentally ill people at the same time.

III. THE "Two WORLDS" THEORY APPLIED TO OTHER GROUPS

Once I understood the nature of the two worlds, I began to look at
other groups of people who have been discriminated against in
America. I thought of the contrast between women who. call
themselves feminists and those who firmly reject the word, between
closeted gay men and those who march in gay pride parades.
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Is the "two worlds" theory simply another way of saying that in
any group suffering discrimination, only a minority are politicized
or radicalized, whereas most prefer to assimilate and minimize their
distinctions from the groups in power, aspiring to a life as ordinary
and untroubled as possible in the context of the roles assigned to
their group by the majority? Is it true that, as Vicki Smith of
MadNation puts it, "just as the gay pride folks had to make room in
their coalition both for Queer to the Left and for Log Cabin
Republicans, we also need to find a way to band together as a
diverse and effective group?""2
I would argue that the distinction between discredited and
discreditable people with psychiatric disabilities is qualitatively
different from the distinctions among African Americans, women,
and gays and lesbians. Although within these groups sharp
disagreements exist about both aspirations and the approaches that
work best to reach those aspirations, there is not the same
fundamental disagreement about identity itself that divides people
with psychiatric disabilities. The very reason that some African
Americans are disappointed with Justice Clarence Thomas is that
they identify him as African American. The question of whether his
values, actions, and behaviors advance their cause presupposes that
he and they share the identity "African American." This is not so
clearly true among the millions of Americans with psychiatric
disabilities.
The better and more compelling analogy is to the chasm between
deaf people who experience deafness as a disability and those who
experience deafness as a culture. This is not merely a disagreement
about goals and strategies. The two groups of people with
psychiatric disabilities-like the two groups of deaf people-differ
dramatically in their experience of their own condition and its
meaning. This difference in the experience of identity is
qualitatively different than that of ethnic minorities or women. It
makes it far more difficult for different subsets of the group to work
for broadly similar goals of equality and recognition of rights.
Rather, the struggle for the definition of identity-the answer to the
question of what deafness or psychiatric disability is-are threshold

128. E-mail from Vicki Smith to Susan Stefan (May 8, 2002) (on file with author).
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questions that determine what various experiences mean and what
should be done in response to them.
For example, for people who believe that deafness is a culture, the
use of cochlear implants demeans or even destroys identity; for
those who believe deafness is a disability, they are seen as a benefit,
a path to integration.'" This raises very difficult questions,
especially where children are concerned. Decisions about whether
a child should receive cochlear implants, or the deliberate decision
to conceive a deaf child through artificial insemination, have caused
a great deal of controversy."13 In this debate, professionals who treat
annoyed by those who see deafness
deafness are, not surprisingly,
1 31
as a culture to be protected.

There is a similar, natural tension between mental health
professionals who see a patient with a medical problem, and many
in the ex-patient movement, who see the terminology of diagnosis
and treatment as masking fundamental political and human rigths
issues.
Some mental health professionals regard people in the throes of
mental illness as no more able to make decisions on their own
behalf than children, and use much the same rhetoric in supporting
forced treatment as are used to support cochlear implants in
children. Many people with psychiatric disabilities, however, reject
the framework of incompetence, and although they acknowledge
great difficulties, they may prefer to struggle through their troubles
rather than be forced to accept ECT or mind-altering medications.
Women were also once considered incapable of making their own
treatment decisions. As recently as twenty years ago, when some
women turned to midwives and natural childbirth, demedicalizing
the experience, medical professionals forecast death and injuries,
and sought to prevent midwives from practicing. 32 When the
disasters that were forecast did not occur, the medical profession
began offering more natural settings for childbirth in hospitals.
129. Bonnie Tucker, The ADA and DeafCulture: Contrasting Precepts, Conflicting Results,
549 ANNALs AM. ACAD. POL. Soc. & Sci. 24, 32-33 (1997).
130. See, e.g., Faith McLellan, Controversy over DeliberateConception of Deaf Child, 359
LANCET 1315 (2002).

131. E. Katherine Russell et al., Cochlear Implants and the Deaf Child: A Nursing
Perspective,4 PEDIATRIC NuRSING 396 (1999).
132. Julie Harmon, Note, Statutory Regulation of Midwives: A Study of CaliforniaLaw, 8
WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 115, 122 (2001).
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The different conceptions people with psychiatric disabilities hold
about identity are created by the huge disparities in their
experiences with mental health professionals and force-a single,
unitary experience from the point of view of many discredited expatients. For them, the medical is the political. They have
experienced force constructed as medical care in the same way that
women subject to forced sterilization and forced cesarian sections
have, but far more universally. They also experience force more
subtly, in the lack of options and alternatives to standard treatment
and in the enormous financial incentives connected to institutional
rather than community care.
However, although the groups are divided in their experience of
force and their desire to demedicalize emotional distress, they share
the common bond, of social stigma and the discrediting of their
accounts of their own experience. Discredited people are not
believed when they say they can parent their children and engage
in responsible employment, and discreditable parents and
employers are not believed when they assert the excruciating
struggles they face on a daily basis to maintain these roles.
CONCLUSION

The more that I considered these two apparently polar opposites,
the more it became clear that they actually expressed two sides of
the same coin, and that this unity explained much about the way
discrimination against people with psychiatric disabilities works in
this country. Neither group is believed or credited when they report
their own perceptions of their situations. The discreditable group's
suffering is erased, and attempts to explain it are discounted; true
agony is marginalized and true heroism goes unseen. The group of
discredited people, who insist on their strengths and capacity, are
equally ignored in favor of an emphasis on symptoms and
dysfunction. Both groups in effect plead with society and the law for
recognition of the complexity of their situations: that disability and
devastating suffering can coexist with accomplishment and
resilience; that people who appear to be successful can be suicidal,
self-injuring, manic, immobile, can suffer anguish or hear voices;
and people who appear to be delusional or disoriented can master
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employment, parenthood, and the challenges of life in the
community.
But the nature of the law, and the broader nature of discrimination on the basis of psychiatric disability, is to insist on two
separate and always dichotomous categories: insane or sane,
disabled or nondisabled, incompetent or competent. If people fall
into the latter categories, their claims of emotional and psychiatric
suffering are not cognizable at law; if they fall into the former
categories, their appeals for rights, independence, and autonomy
often fall on deaf ears in the legal system.
Is there any hope for unifying the two worlds, or, to state a more
limited and realistic goal, for finding common ground among the
discredited and discreditable? As noted above, both groups have
shared the experience of not being believed. Ironically, one of the
chasms between the two groups is that they do not believe each
other. Many of those who reject the medical model and psychiatry
have historically rejected the accounts of former patients who
believe in the illness model. Many of those who believe in the illness
model refuse to believe that articulate spokesmen, such as Dr. Dan
Fisher, were psychiatrically disabled in the first place.
But a new movement is taking shape based on respect for people's
stories and accounts, and in support of the right to make voluntary
and uncoerced choices, whatever those choices may be. Whether one
is discredited or discreditable, the issue of credibility is still a
primary issue. Each group has much to gain by emphasizing the
credibility of the other. Discredited people who wish to be believed
on the issue of their own strengths and capacities can point to
executives, professionals, and celebrities with severe psychiatric
disabilities to emphasize that functioning may be more a matter of
social and income supports than diagnosis. Many of these people
have engaged in behaviors that are the currency of discreditsuicide attempts, cutting, self-injury-and have reported hearing
voices or seeing hallucinations. Asking these people to speak
publicly about what helps them to cope, and listening respectfully
to the array of answers, may increase the public understanding of
the need for alternatives, and the need for treatment to focus on
what works for the individual.
By the same token, discreditable people suffer enormously from
isolation and loneliness. In their world of silence and denial, no one
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may understand what they experience. They could benefit from
reaching out to discredited people, who often have communities and
support unknown to discreditable people. The discredited also can
be extremely informative about resources, networks, and political
activity. Again, discreditable people need to hear the stories of the,
discredited respectfully, and understand the force and coercion that
has shaped their political vision.
Both groups have strength, resilience, and coping skills that are
heroic, given what they have suffered. Neither group can expect to
be heard by society with credibility if it denies credibility to the
stories of those who, ultimately, share some form of common
experience, if only that of being disbelieved.
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APPENDIX A
Survey
Susan Stefan is writing a book about discrimination against
people with diagnoses or labels of psychiatric disability. She would
like to learn more about the perspectives and experiences of people
who have these diagnoses and labels. Please take a few minutes to
fill out this form. As you can see, it is anonymous, and it will help
her a great deal. Please return the survey to Susan Stefan,
University of Miami School of Law, P.O. Box 248087, Coral Gables,
FL 33124-8087. Thank you very much.
1.

Do you believe you have a disability?
__Yes - No.

la.

How would you define or describe "having a disability"?

2.

Do you believe that other people regard you as having a disability?
Yes - No.

3.

Do you believe that you have a physical or mental impairment?
- No.
__Yes

3a.

If yes, does the impairment substantially limit you in one or more major life
activities?
__Yes - No.

3b.

If you answered yes to 3a, please describe:

4.

Are you vulnerable to abuse because you have or are perceived as having a
disability?
No.
Yes
If yes, explain and/or give examples.
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5.

Have you ever been discriminated against?
Yes - No.

5a.

If yes, please check all the categories that apply:
- access to stores, movies, etc.
Housing
how people treated you
access to medical care
-

5b.

employment

-

courtroom situations

insurance
education

-

institutional settings
other (specify below)

-

Did you feel as though you were discriminated against because of

-

Race
sex
age
physical disability

_

religion
sex preference
psychiatric disability or perceived disability
a combination of one or more of the above

6.

In what areas of your life have you experienced the worst discrimination?

7.

Please give examples of the worst discrimination you have encountered.

8.

Please explain how you felt afterward, for how long this effect lasted, and
what impact it had on the way you lived your life after that.

9.

What do you think is the best thing that can be done to make sure these
kinds of things don't keep happening?
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10.

Do you think the Americans With Disabilities Act can prevent these things
from happening to people?
Yes _
No. __
Yes, if

11.

Do you know anyone who sued or was sued under the Americans With
Disabilities Act?
Yes - No.
If yes, what was the case about? What happened?

12.

Do you feel part of the community where you live? Why or why not?

13.

I am writing a book about discrimination, law, and psychiatric disability,
including perceptions of psychiatric disability. What do you want to know
about that I should include?

14.

What do you want other people to know about psychiatric disability,
perceptions of psychiatric disability, discrimination, or law that I should
include?

May I quote from your responses to this survey in my book? The quote would be
anonymous. Unless you want me to use initials, I will simply number all the survey
responses and cite the response by its number.

_

-

-Yes, you may quote from this.
I would like you to use my initials, which are __
I prefer that you cite my survey by its number.

.

